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Many consumers who lack checking accounts are paying relatively high costs to access the
nation’s payments system. Legislation aimed at opening the system to these unbanked individuals
has centered on requiring commercial banks to offer low-cost “lifeline” accounts. But will cost
savings alone motivate these consumers to access the payments system through banks?
Our analysis suggests that lifeline accounts will have
only a limited impact on the unbanked. Many banks 
voluntarily offer accounts priced below lifeline accounts.
Moreover, consumers who currently lack checking
accounts appear relatively unresponsive to small changes
in the price of payments services.  We conclude that 
pricing reform must be accompanied by policies promot-
ing consumer education and more convenient banking 
services if it is to persuade the unbanked that they have
something to gain from accessing the payments system
through depository institutions.
Lifeline Banking
Lifeline banking laws were first  proposed in several
states in the early-to-mid-1980s.1 Thus far, seven states—
Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
York, Rhode Island, and Vermont—have enacted legisla-
tion creating lifeline banking accounts.  These laws range
from authorizing the state banking department to monitor
bank fees and, when appropriate, regulate them, to man-
dating that all state-chartered banks offer a low-cost
checking account.2 At the federal level, amendments to
financial reform bills currently under debate would
require  all banks to offer lifeline banking accounts.
The New York State law is a good example of a 
comprehensive form of lifeline legislation.  The Omnibus
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According to the Federal Reserve System’s 1995 Survey 
of Consumer Finances, more than 10 million Americans 
do not have a checking account.  These “unbanked” citizens
are found in disproportionately high numbers in the low-
income population: about 40 percent of families with
incomes below $10,000 lack a checking account, as opposed
to just 1 percent of families with incomes above $50,000.
Consumer advocates argue that bank fees and mini-
mum balance requirements have deterred low-income
families from establishing relationships with banks.
Prompted by fairness concerns, these advocates have
called for reforms that would ensure inexpensive access
to the payments system—the system that makes the
transfer of funds between individuals and firms pos-
sible. Such access will be particularly important after
1999, when the 1996 Balanced Budget Down Payment
Act will require that all federal government transfer
payments, including social security and welfare pay-
ments, be made electronically.
In this edition of Current Issues, we examine one reform
that has been implemented in a few states and is under con-
sideration at the federal level—a requirement that commer-
cial banks offer low-cost banking accounts known as “life-
line,” or basic, accounts. We assess the degree to which
these accounts reduce costs and evaluate their effectiveness
in drawing the unbanked into the payments system.Consumer Protection and Banking Deregulation Act,
enacted in January 1995, requires state-chartered banks 
in New York to offer low-cost checking accounts.  Such
accounts can be opened with as little as $25, have no mini-
mum balance requirement, carry a maximum maintenance
fee of $3 per month, and must allow at least eight monthly
transactions (New York State Banking Department 1996b).
From a policy perspective, two conditions must 
be met for lifeline banking legislation to provide the
unbanked with greater access to the payments system:
the legislation must reduce the price of payments 
services, and consumers must be sensitive to this price
change.  It appears that while lifeline accounts lower
some payments services costs, many consumers may
not be sensitive to these price changes.
Reduced Pricing
Although detailed information on the use of lifeline
accounts is not available, lifeline legislation clearly low-
ers the price of payments services for some consumers.
Its proponents argue that in addition to drawing the
unbanked into the traditional banking system, lifeline
legislation offers this group inexpensive access to the
payments system in two ways: by lowering the mini-
mum opening balance requirement—an important bar-
rier to opening an account—and by reducing the
monthly maintenance costs they would pay at some
banks. The NewYork State law addresses both of these
cost factors directly: banks must offer accounts with no
minimum balance requirement and can impose only a
low, fixed cost for a set number of monthly transactions.
Indeed, a 1996 study by the Office of the Public
Advocate for the City of New York confirms that life-
line accounts at some New York City banks were sig-
nificantly less expensive than other accounts offered
(Green and Leichter 1996).  The same study, however,
showed that roughly 25 percent of the forty-eight banks
surveyed had low-balance checking accounts that 
were actually less expensive for the consumer than 
the mandated lifeline accounts.3 The 1998 update of 
the Public Advocate’s study again shows that roughly
25 percent of the fifty surveyed banks—which repre-
sent about 20 percent of New York City branches and
10 percent of deposits—offer accounts with lower
monthly fees than the legislated accounts (Green and
Leichter 1998).  Thus, while lifeline legislation has
reduced consumer costs at some banks, it has not sig-
nificantly changed these costs at others.
Price Sensitivity
Lifeline banking will achieve its goals only if the
unbanked are sensitive to the cost advantages it offers
them.  To investigate the extent to which the unbanked
respond to changes in price, we explore how these con-
sumers currently access the payments system and we
compare the associated costs with those of banks. 
Accessing the Payments System: Check-Cashing
Outlets versus Banks. Families without bank accounts
find alternative ways to receive and make payments—
most notably, they use check-cashing outlets.  Instead of
depositing and writing checks, outlet users can cash
checks for a fee and pay bills directly with cash or indi-
rectly by purchasing money orders.  The outlets, which
are located mostly in metropolitan areas, offer a wide
range of other products, such as money wiring, utility
payment services, notary public services, and various
convenience store items.
Nationally, the check-cashing industry has grown
steadily over the past few years, increasing from 2,000
outlets in 1986 to 6,000 by 1995, according to the
National Check Cashers Association (Milligan 1996).
Even major financial institutions such as Chase
Manhattan and GE Capital have expanded into this
area.4 Recently, some state legislatures have increased
the legal maximum on check-cashing fees—a step that
has aided this growth.  In 1995, New York State had
560 check-cashing outlets, about 90 percent of 
which were in New York City.  New York outlets cashed
approximately 31 million checks in 1995, 6 percent
more than they did in 1990; these checks had a total
face value of more than $10 billion, up 13 percent 
from their 1990 value (New York State Banking
Department 1996a).
Despite the growing popularity of check-cashing out-
lets, access to the payments system by this means is rela-
tively expensive (Table 1).  In New York, the outlets typi-
cally charge the legal maximum of 1.1 percent of the face
value of the check.  Thus, a family of four at the 1997 fed-
eral poverty level of $15,600 annual income would pay
$172 to cash all of their paychecks.  By comparison, the
1998 study by the Office of the Public Advocate for the
City of New York calculated that the median cost of a low-
balance checking account at New York City banks was
just $44 per year (Green and Leichter 1998).5 In fact, all
surveyed banks charged less than the $172 check-cashing
fee, and about 80 percent charged less than half of that
fee.  The price gap between banks and check cashers
becomes even wider when bill payment is considered.
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Lifeline banking will achieve its goals 
only if the unbanked are sensitive to the cost
advantages it offers them.3
The $44 bank account cost covers the writing of eight
checks per month.  If money orders are bought as substi-
tutes for checks, then the price of using the check-cashing
outlets increases even further.6
Another way to illustrate this price gap is through
the cost associated with the liquidity advantage pro-
vided by check cashers.  For example, a consumer
could deposit a $100 check in a bank and, after it has
cleared, withdraw the full amount three days later, or
instead go to a check casher charging 1.1 percent of the
value of the check and receive $98.90 immediately.  In
effect, the check casher is providing a three-day loan to
the consumer for an interest payment of $1.10.  This
$1.10 payment for a three-day loan, when calculated as
an annualized percentage rate, is equivalent to an
annual interest rate of 133 percent.  This effective rate
is significantly higher than other consumer loan rates
currently available.
Are the Unbanked Price Sensitive? While data limita-
tions prevent precise estimation of the change in the
quantity of payments services demanded given a change
in price, it appears that the customers of check-cashing
outlets are generally not very sensitive to small price
changes.  Several observations support this contention.
First, note that approximately 9 percent of families
did not have a checking account in 1977—a year when
interest rate ceilings were in effect and checking
accounts were free or inexpensive (Canner and Maland
1987).  Second, only 17 percent of families without
checking accounts in 1995 specifically identified min-
imum balance requirements and service charges as the
main reasons for not having an account (Table 2).
Third, if the unbanked were sensitive to small cost dif-
ferences, they would not be paying the relatively high
effective rates charged by the check-cashing industry.
Their willingness to do so suggests that they do not
regard the services of the outlets and banks as close
substitutes.  What most likely distinguishes the ser-
vices of the outlets from those of banks is the immedi-
ate availability of funds.  For many outlet customers,
this advantage may outweigh all other considerations.
If the unbanked need to pay bills as soon as they
receive a paycheck—or face substantial penalties if
they delay payment—they may choose to pay an outlet
the high liquidity premium.  In this case, even free
checking would not induce outlet users to open a bank
account.  Overall, these observations suggest that 
cost is not the primary motivating factor among 
the unbanked.  Consequently, a marginal, legislated
decrease in banking costs is not likely to prompt outlet
customers to switch to lifeline banking.
Finally, the impact of two regulatory developments
supports our argument that the outlet customers are not
particularly sensitive to changes in the relative cost 
of banking services.  First, legislation over the last two
decades has reduced the maximum number of days that
a bank can hold a check for clearing; this change has
raised the effective interest rate on the “short-term
loans” that check-cashing outlets offer.  Despite these
higher rates, consumer use of the outlets has grown
over this period.  Second, New York State’s legal maxi-
mum check-cashing fee was raised from 0.9 percent to
1.1 percent in 1992, while bank fees remained nearly
constant in real terms.  Meanwhile, outlets in the state
continued to cash more consumer checks and earn
higher revenues annually.7
Table 1
Consumer Costs: Check-Cashing Outlets versus Banks
Cost of Cashing One Year’s Paychecks
Annual At a Check-  Potential 
Income Cashing Outlet At a Bank Savings
$10,000 $110 $44 $66
$7,855a $86 $44 $42
$15,600b $172 $44 $128
Source:  Green and Leichter (1998). 
Notes:  Outlet costs are calculated as 1.1 percent of annual income. Bank costs are 
the median cost of low-balance checking and savings accounts at fifty New York
City banks.
aThe 1997 poverty level for one person.
bThe 1997 poverty level for a family of four.
Table 2
Reasons Cited by Unbanked Families for Not Having 
a Checking Account
Reason 1989 1992 1995
Do not write enough checks
to make it worthwhile 34 30 27
Do not like dealing with banks 15 15 23
Do not have enough money 22 21 21
Minimum balance is too high 8 9 9
Cannot manage or balance
a checking account 5 6 9
Service charges are too high 8 11 8
No bank has convenient
hours or location 1 1 1
Other 7 6 3
Total 100 100 100
Source:  Survey of Consumer Finances (Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and 
Sundén 1997).
Note:  Figures are in percentages.Alternative Policy Prescriptions
We have argued that lifeline legislation will be effective
only if the new accounts reduce the price of payments
services and if the unbanked are responsive to such
reductions in price.  Although lifeline banking often
does lower costs, many other accounts are already
priced below the lifeline accounts.  Moreover, as we
have argued, the unbanked are relatively unresponsive
to small price changes.  Therefore, banking policy ini-
tiatives aimed at assisting the unbanked should not be
limited to price reform.  Policies focusing on the rea-
sons why consumers choose to pay a premium to access
the payments system through bank alternatives may be
equally useful.  We explore three such reasons and the
policy initiatives that might address them.
Locational Convenience
Locational convenience provides one explanation—
though a partial one—for consumer willingness to pay
the relatively high fees charged by check-cashing out-
lets.  Representatives of the check-cashing industry
often cite convenience as a competitive advantage over
banks.  They argue that the outlets have more acces-
sible locations than banks—especially for low-income
families—as well as shorter lines and more attractive
hours of operation.
Some support for these claims comes from journal-
ists and researchers who contend that check-cashing
outlets outnumber bank branches in low-income neigh-
borhoods.  Reeb (1991), for example, found that as of
June 1990, just under 70 percent of all outlets in New
York City were in low-income census tracts.  Moreover,
as of June 1995, 29 percent of the outlets in New York
City were in ZIP code areas with no bank branches
(Table 3).  Nevertheless, many neighborhoods are
served by both check-cashing outlets and banks; in the
case of New York City, 71 percent of the city’s outlets
share a ZIP code area with at least one bank branch,
and about 19 percent of outlets are in areas with more
than ten bank branches.
Although the importance of locational convenience
may be overstated, policy reforms could bring lower
cost access to the payments system to a broader group
of communities.  For example, zoning reform that
allows large retail stores to open in urban areas could
also give the unbanked increased access to financial
services through “supermarket branches.”8 These
branches, which are established by banks in retail
stores, offer many traditional banking services.  They
are accessible, relatively safe, and open long hours—
attributes that allow them to compete directly with
check cashers in terms of convenience.
Another policy initiative that may encourage banks to
become more active in “underserved” areas is the creation
of “banking development districts.”  One such undertak-
ing, launched recently in New York State, allows banks
and local governments to file jointly to establish areas
where local government can offer property tax breaks and
guarantees of government deposits to banks that set up
new branches.  Legislators hope that initiatives of this
type will aid economic development as well as motivate
area residents to join the financial mainstream.9
Consumer Sentiment
Consumers may also choose alternatives to banks
because of their dissatisfaction with bank services.  For
instance, 23 percent of people without bank accounts
claim they do not like dealing with banks (Table 2).
Another 9 percent say they cannot manage or balance a
checking account.  The owners of check-cashing outlets
note that they compete effectively with banks in the
area of customer service and satisfaction by stressing
fast, friendly, and convenient service.  Greater respon-
siveness to consumer preferences may help account for
the outlets’large and growing client base.
Consumer preferences are difficult to address
through public policy initiatives, but some options are
available.  Legislation designed to foster more conve-
nient banking services—and greater awareness of
those services—may improve consumer sentiment
toward the banking system.  For example, initiatives
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Table 3
Locations of New York City Check-Cashing Outlets 
in Relation to Bank Branches
Number of Bank Number of Outlets Outlets as a
Branches in in Those Percentage of All





More than 20 39 8
Total 489 100
Sources:  New York State Banking Department; SNL Branch Migration DataSource
version 1.5; U.S. Postal Service. 
Banking policy initiatives aimed at 
assisting the unbanked should not be 
limited to price reform.aimed at educating consumers about electronic funds
transfer may help familiarize the unbanked with the
ease and convenience of automated teller machines.10
Information Costs
The cost or difficulty of acquiring information about
the price gap between check-cashing outlets and tradi-
tional banks may also help explain why consumers
choose to pay a premium for the services of outlets.
That is, if information about the price of banking 
services is difficult or costly to obtain, it may be sen-
sible for consumers to continue using the outlets, even
though they are paying more than they would be 
using lifeline accounts.  Anecdotal evidence suggests, 
however, that some outlet customers are making an
uninformed choice.  For example, a 1989 study by the
Consumer Bankers Association showed that while 
most outlet customers realized that banks were less
expensive than outlets, more than 30 percent of cus-
tomers without a bank account either did not know
which was more expensive or thought that banks were
more expensive.11
In policy terms, initiatives that reduce the cost 
of collecting price information on financial services 
could directly help the unbanked.  Such efforts could 
stand alone or be part of the conversion to electronic 
funds transfer.  Educating consumers about the price gap
between the cost of payments services at banks and bank
alternatives would at least help them to make more
informed choices.
Conclusion
The fact that some consumers, particularly low-income
families, pay relatively high prices for access to the
payments system is a policy concern.  Recent initiatives
at the state level have focused on lowering the price 
of banking services and encouraging the unbanked to
use more traditional payment methods.  Our analysis
indicates that such initiatives, although helpful, may
have a limited impact for two reasons.
First, recent surveys of New York City banks 
indicate that lifeline banking legislation may not 
significantly lower consumer costs since many banks
already voluntarily offer services priced below the
mandated maximums.  Moreover, even if costs are
reduced, many of the unbanked appear to be relatively
unresponsive to such price changes.  Thus, policy ini-
tiatives that are not price-based should also be consid-
ered.  In particular, measures that increase the conve-
nience of banking services and inform consumers of
the potential savings from using these services could
prove effective in assisting the unbanked. 
Notes
1. The elimination of deposit rate ceilings in the 1980s led banks to
price checking account services explicitly.  This development
prompted consumer advocates to argue that some people would not
be able to afford banking services (see Canner and Maland [1987]). 
2. Massachusetts requires banks to offer no-fee savings and
checking accounts to people over sixty-five or under eighteen.
Rhode Island and Minnesota require banks to offer no-fee sav-
ings accounts, and Minnesota is also debating lifeline checking
legislation.  New Jersey and New York have lifeline checking
legislation of the type described, while Illinois has similar legis-
lation that applies to senior citizens only.  Finally, Vermont con-
ducts a quarterly survey of bank prices, and the state banking
department has the authority to regulate prices if necessary; cur-
rently, there are no price regulations in Vermont.
3. The authors of the study calculate the cost of a low-balance
account based on their profile of a low-balance bank customer.
Such a customer is said to have an average balance of $750 and
make eleven transactions each month.  The cost of these accounts to
the customer is calculated as the annual fees minus interest earned.
Opening balance requirements are not incorporated in the cost.
4. For a more complete discussion of recent entries into the check-
cashing industry, see Branch (1998).
5. The $44 cost includes the interest earned on the $750 average
balance held by the survey’s low-balance bank customer.  For cus-
tomers with less than that amount, the actual cost may be higher.
6. The fee associated with money orders is not set by legislation.  A
1994 study by the Office of the Public Advocate for the City of New
York estimates that cashing checks and using money orders to pay
bills costs up to $200 to $250 per year (Green and von Nostitz
1994).  Burt (1991) estimates the annual cost of cashing checks and
paying bills to be between $84 and $297 at a check-cashing outlet,
compared with $10 to $40 at a bank, depending on usage. 
7. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1992,
1996).  Other states also increased the legal maximum check-cashing
fee (see Caskey [1996]).
8. See Radecki, Wenninger, and Orlow (1996) for a discussion of
these branches and similar banking developments.
9. More details on banking development districts can be obtained from
Newsday (1998) and New York State Banking Department (1998).
10. Note that while many respondents to the Survey of Consumer
Finances indicate that they choose not to use checking accounts
because they are dissatisfied with bank services, others cite differ-
ent reasons (Table 2).  The largest percentage of respondents claim
that they do not write enough checks to make opening an account
worthwhile; others indicate that banking services are too expensive.
Given that Table 1 provides evidence that check-cashing outlets are
more expensive than banks, some respondents may have other, less
expensive access to the payments system; for example, they may
cash checks at a merchant at no cost and pay bills in cash.
11. While this study may be biased because only users of check-
cashing outlets were surveyed, it nevertheless shows that a lack of
information is partly responsible for the use of these more costly out-
lets.  For a more in-depth discussion of the study, see Caskey (1996).
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